Having a higher productivity is only one way to contribute more to a cooperative interaction.
6
Another natural way is to spend more time to amass resources. To test the robustness of our 7 partner choice mechanism, we thus created a third set of simulations in which there are no more 8 dierences of productivity between individuals, but one of the two individuals in a cooperating 9 dyad has to invest m times more time than her partner. We thus model the possibility that 10 there is a cooperative role more time-consuming than the other. In practice, we model this interaction, however, they are forced to postpone their social interaction to a later encounter.
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We assume that this entails an explicit cost expressed as a discounting factor δ (0 ≤ δ < 1 partner's productivity). We thus have: 
117
Similarly, the payo of a HP individual in this population is
with b the productivity of HP individuals. Solving the system composed of equations (2) 119 and (3) 
Solving this system gives us an expression for G HP and G LP as a function of x and δ at 159 the evolutionary equilibrium:
From (5) In this case, the average payo of LP and HP individuals respectively can be written as:
Solving this system gives us an expression for G HP and G LP as a function of x and δ at the 174 evolutionary equilibrium:
From (6) 
198
Situation A:
Situation C:
Situation B:
Situation A & B: x (a + a)
As explained in the previous section, the verication that it is not possible for some (but 
